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Bayesian Statistics for Biological Data: 
PEDIGREE ANALYSIS 
WILLIAM D. STANSFIELD MATTHEW A. CARLTON 
I n teaching biology, there may be a tendency to con- 
centrate too much on the descriptive aspects of the sub- 
ject. A well-rounded education in the biological sciences 
also requires experience in the gathering and statistical 
analysis (interpretation) of quantitative data from field 
or laboratory studies. There are numerous mathemati- 
cal tools and computer programs to help us do this 
today. Introducing students to some of these tools and 
their practical applications should be part of every biol- 
ogy class. One of these tools is known as Bayesian analy- 
sis. The specific purposes of this report are to: 
* Introduce Bayes' formula. 
* Demonstrate its application to the biological 
problem of pedigree analysis. 
* Illustrate that Bayes' formula and non-Bayesian 
or "classical" methods of probability calculation 
may yield different answers. 
It is the authors' hope to alert biology teachers to 
this potential disparity and to underscore the impor- 
tance of Bayes' formula in pedigree analysis and a wide 
range of other biological applications. 
Typical applications of the Bayesian method involve 
estimation of an unobservable parameter that describes 
an entire population using observable (objective) data 
derived by sampling techniques (Ledley, 1965). For 
example, a clinical trial might be designed to test the 
effectiveness of a drug in reducing the incidence of dia- 
betes in a test group of individuals as compared with a 
control group of individuals who do not receive the 
drug, both groups being matched as closely as possible 
in all other respects (age, sex, lifestyles, health profiles, 
etc.). Bayesian methods are especially useful for analyz- 
ing more complex multivariate problems such as clini- 
cal trials designed to simultaneously gather data on two 
or more variables (e.g., age and drug treatment, or age, 
sex, and drug treatment). 
Awareness of so-called Bayesian statistics certainly 
is appropriate at the introductory college level. It also 
could be introduced at the high school level were it not 
for the fact that many biology teachers have been short- 
changed in their formal statistical education. This unfor- 
tunate situation is likely to continue unless they receive 
help from sources like The American Biology Teacher. We 
believe our paper could be a first step toward providing 
the kind of help they need. In applying the information 
in this report, biology teachers should try to focus their 
students' attention on the fact that there often is more 
than one way to analyze biological data and that differ- 
ent analytical procedures may lead to different solu- 
tions, rather than focusing merely on the empirical 
results of a statistical analysis. They should also be 
made aware of the assumptions underlying the use of 
any statistical tool. For example, applying an analysis of 
variance to compare populations that do not roughly 
conform to normal distributions invalidates the results. 
Students should at least be made aware that there are 
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statistical tools, e.g., the Kruskal-Wallis test, for analyz- 
ing non-normal data distributions. This report demon- 
strates that Bayesian and non-Bayesian analyses of pedi- 
grees may or may not give the same results, forcing the 
investigator in the latter case to make value judgements. 
We also suggest criteria for determining which method 
is likely to be more appropriate, and we provide "how- 
to" examples of both types of analyses. A third method 
(Norton, 1937) for analyzing pedigrees is presented 
that yields the same result as the Bayesian method, 
thereby validating that approach. We are not aware of 
any basic genetics textbook that explains either the 
value of Bayes' formula or how to use it in the analysis 
of pedigrees. Likewise, Norton's formula does not 
appear in these books. 
Historical Background 
The English nonconformist minister and mathe- 
matician Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) has been called the 
Father of Inductive Probability (Anonymous 2). Ever 
since his pioneering work, the field of statistics seems to 
have been divided into two camps, the Bayesians and 
the Non-Bayesians (or frequentists). 
[N]either side can clearly be shown to be wrong. When 
prior probabilities are given as data, the Non-Bayesean 
(sic) generally has no objection to the use of Bayes (sic) 
formula, but when prior probabilities are lacking he 
deplores the Bayesean's tendency to make them up out 
of thin air. 
(Anonymous I) 
When using Bayesian methods to quantify the 
probability that a hypothesis is correct, unknown 
quantities are described by a joint probability dis- 
tribution. As each piece of evidence is brought into 
the equation, the effect is conditional on all previ- 
ous evidence. Assuming that each piece of evidence 
gives no information about any other piece of evi- 
dence avoids this difficulty. However, conditional 
independence does not always hold (Anonymous 
2). Therein lies the basis of much of the controver- 
sy over the use of Bayesian inference. 
The axioms of probability theory and the algebraic 
rules for manipulating probabilities that follow 
from them are generally accepted by both classical 
and Bayesian statisticians - even Bayes's (sic) theo- 
rem is not questioned with respect to its algebraic 
validity. The controversy concerns only the defini- 
tion and interpretation of probabilities, not their 
algebraic manipulation. (Weber, 197) 
As long as all the pertinent data (pieces of evi- 
dence) become available, does it make any dif- 
ference (to the probability that our hypothesis is 
correct) whether these data are considered ran- 
dom or deterministic? A partial answer to this 
question will be presented at the conclusion of 
this report. 
Bayes' Formula 
At the heart of Bayesian methodology is Bayes' for- 
mula (also called Bayes' theorem). To understand Bayes' 
formula, one must first understand the notion of con- 
ditional probability. In words, for two random events A 
and B, the "conditional probability of A, given B" refers 
to the chance A will occur under the supposition that B 
has occurred. For example, shuffle a deck of cards, then 
define A = {we deal an ace] and B = {we deal a king]. 
Then while the probabilities of A and B are both 4/52, 
the conditional probability of A, given B, equals 4/51. 
Why? Because the supposition that B has occurred 
removes one king from the original deck of 52 cards, 
leaving only 51 cards (4 of which are aces). In mathe- 
matics, we denote these values by P(A) = P(B) = 4/52 
and P(A I B) = 4/51, respectively. The vertical bar (I) may 
be read as "given." 
Note in the above example that the conditional 
probability of B given A is also 4/5 1: P(B I A) = 4/5 1. This 
is coincidental to the symmetry of events A and B. 
Bayes' formula gives the general relationship between 
these two conditional probabilities: 
P(B jA) = P(B) x P(A I B) 
P(A) 
(One can easily verify that the four values from our pre- 
vious example satisfy this equation.) The derivation of 
this formula is not complicated and appears in many 
standard probability and statistics texts (e.g., Peck et al., 
2001; Mendenhall et al., 2003). 
As noted before, the controversy surrounding so- 
called Bayesian methods stems not from the validity of 
this formula, but rather the appropriateness of viewing 
certain events as "random" and, thus, describable in 
terms of probability. In what follows, we will consider 
two examples: one in which Bayes' formula and the 
"classical" (frequentist) approach yield the same mathe- 
matical result, and one in which they disagree, followed 
by an independent third method that validates the 
Bayesian approach. 
Pedigree Analysis 
The following example is not typical of statistical 
applications of the Bayesian method because it involves 
only a small amount of data concerning the genotype of 
a single individual in a specific pedigree rather than 
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estimation of a parameter in an entire population. It is, 
however, a real example of the simplest type of Bayesian 
analysis, where the estimand (an unobserved quantity 
for which statistical inferences are made) and an indi- 
vidual item of data each have only two possible values 
(Gelman, 1995). Suppose that black hair color in guinea 
pigs is governed by a dominant gene (B) and brown 
color is produced when its recessive allele (b) is in 
homozygous condition (bb). Consider the pedigree in 
Figure 1. 
Generation I ( b 
1 ~~~2 
Generation 11 B- 
Both parents (11 and 12) in generation I are pheno- 
typically black and genetically heterozygous (Bb). Their 
male offspring (Ill) is black, but its genotype is incom- 
pletely known (B-). Barring mutation, the process of 
meiosis should produce B and b gametes with equal fre- 
quencies in the parents, just like the tossing of a coin is 
expected to produce equally frequent heads or tails 
events. The unconditional a priori genotypic probabili- 
ties for all possible offspring in generation 11 are 1/4 BB: 
1/2 Bb: 1/4 bb. We note that among the black progeny, 
heterozygotes (Bb) are expected to be twice as frequent 
as homozygotes (BB); a 2:1 ratio respectively. Thus, 
once we see that the phenotype of the male offspring Ill 
is black, we can then predict the conditional a posteri- 
ori probability (among all possible black offspring) that 
III is heterozygous = 2/3. 
Bayes' formula will now be used to derive the same 
answer (although in other pedigrees this may not 
always be true, as will be shown later). To do so, we will 
rewrite the previous formula slightly. We may interpret 
Bayes' formula as a rule for revising belief in a hypothe- 
sis H (i.e., the probability of H) given certain evidence E 
and background information, or genetic context, G. 
Bayes' formula then states: 
P(H I F,G) = P(H I G)P(E I H,G) 
Notice that, in addition to a notational change (H 
for B and F for A), all elements of this probability for- 
mula are now conditional upon the genetic context, G. 
Let us pause here briefly to understand the elements of 
the formula. 
* The left-hand term, P(H I E, G), represents the a 
posteriori probability that the hypothesis H is 
true, given both the evidence E and the genetic 
context G. 
* The P(H I G) term is the a priori probability of H, 
given G. In Bayesian terms, P(H I G) reflects our 
"prior belief' in H before the evidence E is con- 
sidered. 
* The term P(E I H, G) is called the likelihood, and 
gives the probability that our evidence E would 
occur, assuming the hypothesis H and back- 
ground information G are true. 
* The denominator P(E i G) is independent of H 
and can be regarded as a normalizing or scaling 
constant. 
* The background information G is a conjunction 
of all other statements relevant to determining 
P(H I G) and P(E I G). (Stutz, 1994) 
With regard to the pedigree in Figure 1, our context 
G is the fact that the genotypes of parents I1 and 12 are 
known for certain to be heterozygous (Bb); our hypoth- 
esis H is that 11 is heterozygous (Bb); and our evidence 
E is that III is black. Now, we must calculate the terms 
on the right-hand side of Bayes' formula. 
* Within the context G, the a priori probability of 
H (i.e., without considering the evidence E) is 
1/2, since half of all possible offspring from two 
heterozygote parents are expected to be het- 
erozygous. That is, P(H I G) = 1/2. 
* If our hypothesis H is true and II is heterozy- 
gous, then II1 is guaranteed to be black (since 
black dominates). That is, conditional on H 
being true, E must be true. Thus, the "likelihood" 
term P(E I H,G) equals 1 in this case. 
* Lastly, in the context G of two heterozygous par- 
ents, there is a 3/4 probability an offspring will 
be black (all possible outcomes except bb). 
Hence, P(E G) = 3/4. 
Now the probability that our hypothesis H is correct, 
after considering the conditional evidence E that III is 
observed to be black, in the genetic context G of his par- 
ents being known heterozygotes, can be calculated 
using Bayes' formula: 
P(H I G)P(E I H,G) (1/2)(1) 2 P(j,) 
P(FI}G) (3/4) -3 
That is, Bayes' formula gives a result identical to the 
"classical" (frequentist) approach we took previously. 
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Figure 2. 
Generation I B B 
1 2 
Generation 11 Bb B 
1 2 
Generation III B- 
1 
Without the use of Bayes' 
theorem, let us analyze the 
pedigree in Figure 2. Given the 
genetic context that 112 and 
1111 are both phenotypically 
black, our objective is to deter- 
mine the probability that IIII is 
heterozygous (Bb). The calcula- 
tion requires the four steps dis- 
played below. In Steps 2 and 3, 
we will use a more basic fact from probability: if the 
probability of an event A is p,, and the conditional prob- 
ability of event B given A is P2, then the probability of 
the joint event {A and BI equals the product of (P,)(P2). 
1. Considering the genotypes of generation I, the 
probability that 112 is BB equals 1/2 and the 
probability that 112 is Bb equals 1/2. 
2. In the case that 112 is BB, the conditional proba- 
bility that III 1 is Bb equals 1/2. Hence, P(II2 is BB 
and 1111 is Bb) = (1/2)(1/2) = 1/4. 
3. In the case that 112 is Bb, the conditional proba- 
bility that 1111 is Bb equals 2/3, as calculated in 
the previous example. Hence, P(112 is Bb and 1111 
is Bb) = (1/2)(2/3) = 2/6 = 1/3. 
4. If the approach taken in Steps 1, 2, and 3 is valid, 
then we find the total probability that 1111 is Bb 
by adding the probabilities of Steps 
2 and 3: 
1/4 + 1/3 = 3/12 + 4/12 = 7/12. 
In the previous calculation, the state- 
ment that 1111 is phenotypically 
black was not treated as a random event (which 
would carry a probability), but rather as a known 
fact. We now analyze the same pedigree with 
Bayes' formula, to find the probability of the 
hypothesis H = (1111 is Bb}, given the evidence E 
= {III1 is black}. This will require one additional 
set of calculations. To that end, let us initially 
allow all possible genotypes for 1111 to be pro- 
duced, as shown in Figure 3. 
The total a priori probability, among all possible off- 
spring in generation III, of producing an individual of 
genotype Bb is found by summation of the three aster- 
isk-labeled probabilities in Figure 3: 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/8 = 
1/2. That is, in the genetic context G provided by Figure 
2, the a priori probability of the hypothesis H that III 1 is 
Bb equals 1/2. 
If now we are given the additional evidence E that 
1111 is black, Bayes' formula can be used to modify our 
belief in the previous hypothesis H (viz, the probability 
that 1111 is Bb is 1/2). We have computed P(H I G) in 
the preceding paragraph. By the same reasoning as in 
our first example-if 1111 is of genotype Bb, then she 
must be phenotypically black-the likelihood term again 
equals 1. Finally, we use the branching diagram above to 
compute the denominator of Bayes' formula: 
P(E I G) = P(III1 is black I G) = 1 - P(III1 is brown I G) 
= 1 - 1/8 = 7/8. 
In the last step, we have used the fact that the 
brown allele (b) is recessive, and hence 1111 is pheno- 
typically brown only if she is genotypically bb. 
Therefore, using Bayes' formula, the probability that III 1 
is Bb (H), given evidence E that 1111 is black (B-), in the 
genetic context G that 112 may be either BB or Bb with 
probabilities of 1/2 each, is: 
Notice that Bayes' solution (4/7) disagrees with the 
"classical" solution (7/12). 
continued on page 182 
Figure 3. 
|- 112: BB (1/2) or 112: Bb (1/2) 
1111: BB (1/2) Bb (1/2) BB (1/4) Bb (1/4) bB (1/4) bb (1/4) 
Probability: (1/4) (1/4)* (1/8) (1/8)* (1/8)* (1/8) ) 
P(H E,G) = P(HIG)P(EIH,G) (1/4 + 1/8 + 1/8)(1) = 1/2 4 P(H 
~~P(E IG) 1-(1/8) 7/8 7 
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An equivalent way to summarize the data for all 
black individuals in the branching diagram is as follows. 
Types of Pedigrees Combined 
112 1111 Probabilities Ratio 
BB (1/2) BB (1/2) 1/4 = 2/8 2 
BB (1/2) Bb (1/2) 1/4 = 2/8 2* 
Bb (1/2) BB (1/4) 1/8 1 
Bb (1/2) Bb (1/2) 1/4 = 2/8 2** 
Total = 7 
Thus, the a posteriori hypothesis that 1111 is Bb is 
expected to be true in 4 of every 7 pedigrees of this 
kind. Step 3 of the non-Bayesian procedure did not 
allow the unconditional a priori production of all possi- 
ble genotypes in generation III before combining proba- 
bilities under the condition that 1111 is black, as illus- 
trated in Figure 3 and verified by the use of Bayes' for- 
mula. In this particular pedigree, the non-Bayesian solu- 
tion (7/12 = 0.5833) and the solution using Bayes' for- 
mula (4/7 = 0.5714) are very nearly the same. However, 
there is a net probability decrease of 0.0119 using the 
Bayesian approach. It might seem intuitively that 
Bayesian probabilities should always be greater than 
probabilities derived by non-Bayesian methods. 
However, this one example illustrates that this may not 
always be true. 
Comparison with a Third Method 
In 1937, H. W. Norton developed general formulas 
for calculating the probability of homozygosis among 
individuals exhibiting dominant phenotypes in pedi- 
grees. These formulas were generated independently of 
Bayes' theorem. According to Norton, if two parental B- 
individuals in a pedigree have probabilities u and v, 
respectively, of being homozygous (BB), the proportion 
p of BB individuals among their B- progeny is: 
1 + u + V + UV 
3 +u+v-uv 
In applying this formula to the pedigree in Figure 2, 
let p be the probability that III is BB, and u and v be the 
probabilities that Ill and 112 are BB, respectively. Then 
Norton's formula gives: 
1+0+(1/2)+0(1/2) 3 
r 3 + 0+(1/2) -0 (1/2) 7 
Thus, the probability that 1111 is heterozygous (Bb) 
is 1 - (3/7) = 4/7, in agreement with the solution that 
was derived above by use of Bayes' theorem. 
Conclusion 
As noted above, the disparity between the two solu- 
tions for the heterozygosity of III1 (7/12 vs. 4/7) 
depends upon whether we consider the event {III1 is 
black) to be initially a known fact (the non-Bayesian 
method) or an event which carries a certain probability 
(the Bayesian method). The Bayesian method is most 
useful for revising a prior hypothesis based on new 
data. Under the assumption that no new data will 
become available that might cause us to reconsider the 
prior hypothesis that 1111 could be either BB or Bb, a 
classical analysis might be considered to be more justi- 
fied. However, if neither the genotype nor the pheno- 
type of 1111 were known initially, but later we learn that 
1111 is black, then a Bayesian analysis might be consid- 
ered more justified because the a priori possibility that 
1111 might be brown (bb) could be eliminated from con- 
sideration. Thus, solutions to problems of this kind may 
vary depending on whether all pertinent data are ini- 
tially available or only become available piecemeal. 
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